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1. Introduction
The financial crisis triggered tectonic shifts in the economic, social and political landscape of the 
European  Union  (EU).  In  particular,  Greece,  Portugal,  Italy,  Ireland,  and  Spain  experienced  a 
sudden  hike  in  their  sovereign  bond  spreads,  reflecting  the  market’s  perception  of  elevated 
economic, financial and political risk (Fischer and Dötz, 2010). In contrast, bond spreads in other 
EU countries  such as  Germany reached historic  lows  (Attinasi  et  al.,  2009).  In  the media,  this 
divergence prompted headlines implying fire-sales from crisis-stricken countries to Germany and 
other less affected EU countries. The Wall Street Journal announced that “Greece is for sale - cheap 
- and Germany is buying”, referring to acquirers such as Deutsche Telekom AG and Fraport AG 
(Lawton and Stevens, 2011). In a similar vein, The Guardian claimed that “Greece embarks on a 
fire-sale” to,  inter  alia,  “the EU’s  powerhouse,  Germany” (Smith,  2012) and also reported that 
Portuguese assets were sold to Swiss and French companies (Tremlett, 2012). It is in this context 
that this paper investigates how the financial crisis affected cross-border transactions of corporate 
assets  between EU countries.  This paper tests  Krugman’s (2000) ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis  that 
states that foreign acquisitions of target firms from crisis countries surge amid a financial crisis. 
These  target  firms  are  sold  at  prices  below  fundamental  values.  Only  a  few  studies  on  FDI 
considered macroeconomic shocks explicitly investigating the East Asian financial crisis (Acharya 
et al., 2010; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Krugman, 2000), the 1995 Latin American financial crisis 
(Krugman, 2000), and banking and currency crises before 2007 in emerging markets (Alquist et al., 
2013). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on fire-sale FDI that focuses on the 
recent financial crisis and its impact on EU countries. The EU lends itself to a study of determinants  
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)1 before and amid the financial crisis, as economic 
differences  between  countries  widened,  whereas  institutional  environments,  including  M&A 
regulation, converged.2 The latter is important as differences in corporate governance play a crucial 
1 Although technically inaccurate, we use the terms ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’, ‘takeover’ and ‘M&A’ synonymously.
2  The effectiveness of EU merger regulation has increased significantly over the period 1990-2002 (Duso et al., 
2011).
3role in FDI and cross-border M&A (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al., 2008; Chari et al., 2010;  
Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 2006). By focusing on the EU, we reduce confounding 
effects  of  heterogeneity  in  M&A regulation  and  governance,  increasing  the  tractability  of  our 
analysis. Moreover, several important policy questions, ranging from integrating financial markets 
to  stimulating intra-European FDI,  hinge crucially  on the existence of fire-sale  FDI during the 
financial crisis (e.g., Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Accordingly, we test the fire-sale FDI hypotheses 
and three of its key implications in EU countries: (i) more cross-border sales of corporate assets  
from countries that were hit hardest by the crisis, (ii) lower prices for corporate assets in crisis 
countries,  and  (iii)  more  cross-border  sales  and  lower  prices  when  credit  and  macroeconomic 
conditions deteriorate. 
Establishing evidence of fire sales in EU countries is challenging. First, we have to identify 
whether  prices  of  corporate  assets  drop  below  fundamental  values.  Predicting  fair  values  of 
corporate assets is difficult under normal conditions, let alone during a financial crisis. We sidestep 
this issue by comparing the prices of corporate assets from crisis countries sold during the crisis 
with prices  before the crisis  and with prices  from non-crisis  countries.  Second,  FDI in  Europe 
during the past 20 years clustered over time due to two merger waves. We tackle this issue by ‘de-
cycling’ country-specific cross-border activity with the European merger cycle. Finally, the match 
between home and host countries in cross-border mergers is not random. Particularly during the 
crisis, many country-pair combinations of acquirers and targets were avoided consistently. Hence, if 
we analyze observed cross-border transactions at face value, we run the risk of a selection bias. 
Therefore, we use a Heckman procedure that first estimates the propensity of an acquirer country to 
be part of the sample before considering the determinants for selecting target countries.
We analyze a large panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012. 
The cross-section and the time line of the sample permits us to compare cross-border transactions in 
crisis  countries  with  non-crisis  countries  both  before  and  during  the  crisis.  Focusing  on  three 
distinct implications of the fire sale hypothesis, we start with the question whether cross-border 
4sales of corporate assets from Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain increased in the crisis. 
Despite weak indications for more sales to foreign firms, we do not detect a higher share of cross-
border merger activity in these countries, neither over the whole sampling period, nor in the crisis 
period. In general, we find that cross-border activity declined in all EU countries during the crisis. 
Reconsidering  our  classification  of  crisis  countries,  we  use  sovereign  risk  measures, 
macroeconomic demand conditions and credit conditions to identify countries in distress. Here, we 
do find evidence consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis for countries with higher default risk and 
lower economic demand during the crisis. However, for countries with lower domestic credit, which 
provide the most important ‘test bed’ for the fire-sale hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the 
notion of a sell-out of corporate assets in times of a liquidity shortage. To assess whether corporate 
assets are traded at a discount, we investigate the premiums paid for targets. Our results show that 
premiums are  lower  in  crisis  countries,  but  they  do not  decline  during  the  crisis.  When using 
sovereign risk measurements, macroeconomic demand conditions, and credit conditions, we find 
evidence for depressed prices if access to credit is low in the target country. This effect, however, is 
not stronger in the crisis period, inconsistent with fire-sale FDI. In contrast to public opinion, we 
find little evidence for the view that crisis countries fire-sale their assets to other countries in the 
EU.
2. Theoretical and empirical background
The empirical FDI literature on the impact of financial crises is still in its infancy and scattered.  
Krugman (2000) was first to notice that the capital flight out of East Asian countries during the 
1997-1998 crisis was coupled with a substantial increase of inward FDI. He observed a similar 
pattern  in  Mexico  and  Argentina  during  the  Latin  American  crisis  of  1995.  Krugman  (2000) 
suggests that corporate assets in crisis countries are sold to foreign investors at discounted prices 
due to tightening credit conditions and deteriorating macroeconomic stability.3 He also coined the 
3  Krugman (2000) cites anecdotal evidence from the financial media, which often express this idea, especially in the 
context of financial crises. His approach is related to earlier work by Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
5term ‘fire-sale FDI’ for this phenomenon.
However,  it  is  not  a  given that  lower prices  in  target  countries  trigger  FDI inflows.  In 
efficient capital markets, target discounts should only compensate for higher risk acquirers have to 
take during a crisis.4 The fire-sale hypothesis therefore depends on the assumption of temporary 
capital market frictions, such as unduly tight credit conditions, which were very prominent in the 
East Asian financial crisis (Krugman, 2000). In the absence of such credit constraints in the target’s 
domestic capital market, target prices may be low, but do not necessarily reflect undervaluation 
after risk-adjustment. Therefore, Baker et al.  (2009) theoretically distinguish two capital  market 
related motivations for FDI flows. Under the fire-sale hypothesis, “FDI flows reflect the purchase of 
undervalued  host-country  assets”  (p.339).  Here,  as  in  Krugman  (2000),  undervaluation  is  the 
underlying  factor  that  pulls  FDI into a  country.  This  stands  in  contrast  to  the  ‘cheap financial 
capital’ hypothesis, where “FDI flows are an opportunistic use of the relatively low-cost financial 
capital  available  to  overvalued  source-country  firms”  (p.338).  Here,  ‘cheap  capital’  is  the 
underlying factor that pushes FDI into a target country. Baker et al. (2009) also refer to this view as 
‘cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals’, where acquirers with relatively easy access to 
financial capital seek to invest their cheap capital in target countries with relatively higher domestic 
cost of capital.  Both the fire-sale hypothesis  and the cheap financial  capital  hypothesis  assume 
market imperfections in the target’s or the acquirer’s country. Hence, in the European crisis, three 
scenarios are possible. First, if credit constraints in crisis countries dominate, we should observe 
fire-sale FDI. Second, if lower capital costs in non-crisis countries dominate, we should observe 
cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals. Third, if the European capital market provides a 
sufficient integration of both the target and acquirer market, we should not observe any crisis effects 
in FDI. This paper is primarily interested in the first of the three scenarios; however, the conclusion 
discusses the implications of our results for the other two scenarios.
Empirically,  Baker et  al.  (2009) limit  a direct comparison of the fire-sale and the cheap 
4  Acquirers may, for example, be exposed to higher domestic economic and political risk, or face higher liquidity 
risk.
6financial capital hypotheses to a preliminary analysis of FDI data (1975-2001) in which they find 
that FDI flows are positively related (unrelated) to the average market-to-book ratios of the acquirer 
(target) countries, consistent with the cheap financial capital hypothesis and contrary to the fire-sale 
hypothesis. In their sample, one of the countries involved is always the US. This makes it difficult 
to apply their findings to the EU. Moreover, they do not explicitly analyze the effects of financial 
crises.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) provide first large-scale empirical evidence for fire-sale FDI 
and M&As during a financial crisis. Despite a decrease in domestic M&A activity, they find a 92% 
increase of FDI into East Asia during the 1997-1998 crisis. Companies with liquidity constraints 
have been purchased indicating fire-sales. Acharya et al. (2010) develop a theoretical model and 
show a similar pattern of increased inbound FDI and foreign ownership. Alquist et al. (2013) use 
M&A data from the Thomson Reuters SDC database (1990-2007) to analyze fire-sale FDI in 16 
emerging economies during banking crises. Similar to our results, the authors find little evidence for 
fire-sale FDI in a crisis. They conclude that “contrary to the conventional wisdom, fire-sale FDI (...) 
seem to be ‘business as usual’ rather than characteristic features of FDI undertaken during financial 
crises in emerging market economies” (p.20). 
We add to this literature by focusing on EU countries and on the most recent financial crisis. 
Moreover, methodologically, we correct for merger waves and for an alleged sample selection bias 
using  a  Heckman  procedure.  As  a  more  general  contribution,  the  paper  also  adds  to  our 
understanding of cross-border M&As, particularly in Europe. 
3. Methodology
3.1 Sampling
In line with previous studies on fire-sale FDI (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Alquist et al., 2013), we 
focus on M&As rather than all forms of FDI, which would include greenfield investments. The 
latter is, by definition, not an acquisition of existing business and thereby does not lend itself to the 
7purchase  or  sale  of  targets  in  a  fire-sale  operation.5 M&As  play  a  predominant  role  in  FDI 
accounting for up to 80% of FDI flows during merger waves (Stiebale and Reize, 2011).
We employ the Thomson Reuters SDC database and consider deals announced from January 
1999 to December 2012. We chose 1999 as starting date, as it marks the introduction of the Euro in 
several EU countries. We only include M&As involving acquirer and target countries from the 27 
EU member states (as of 2012). As explained in the introduction, we focus on mergers within the 
EU to reduce confounding effects of institutional heterogeneity, particularly with regard to M&A 
regulations, and to be able to address important EU policy questions that pertain to intra-European 
FDI  (e.g.,  Coeurdacier  et  al.,  2009).  The  sample  excludes  financials,  utilities,  or  government 
agencies due to differences in reporting and regulation (as in, e.g., Erel et al. 2012). We exclude 
LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, and repurchases of own shares. Our 
final sample includes 76,479 M&As, out of which 19,024 are cross-border deals representing 24.9% 
of all transactions. 
3.2 Methodological challenge #1: Potential selection bias
Table 1 shows the number of mergers per country pair over the entire investigation period. The first 
column denotes the acquirer country and the first row the target country. The columns ‘Total’ and 
‘Total (%)’ report the number of all cross-border mergers per acquirer or target country and their 
fraction of all inbound or outbound mergers in percent. Many countries severely affected by the 
crisis,  i.e.  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Portugal  and  Spain  (Beetsma et  al.,  2013;  Kalbaska  and 
Gatkowski,  2012),  are  net  providers  of  targets.  Spain  was a  target  in  6.9% of  all  cross-border 
mergers, but an acquirer in only 3.5%. Portugal was also twice as often a target than an acquirer  
country (1.7% v 0.8%, respectively). Italy was a target in 5.7% of all inbound mergers, but an 
acquirer in only 5%. In contrast, many countries that did not get into difficulties in the sovereign 
debt markets are net providers of acquirers (Beetsma et al., 2013). Dutch firms, for example, were 
5  We acknowledge that the term ’fire-sale FDI’ is misleading as FDI includes greenfield; however, this is in line with 
the literature (Krugman, 2000). 
8acquirers in 10.1% of all cases, but targets in only 7%. Similar ratios also apply to Sweden, the UK, 
and France.
=== INCLUDE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ===
The  large  variation  of  merger  cases  per  country  overweighs  merger-active  countries  in 
simple cross-sectional estimations with individual mergers as the unit of observation. We therefore 
follow Erel et al. (2012) and aggregate all mergers between two countries into an ordered country-
pair panel. Thus, the unit of observation is one cell of Table 1; one for each quarter in the sample 
period from 1999 to 2012. Note that UK-France and France-UK are two ordered country pairs, 
reflecting different bilateral flows between the two countries.
Table 1 also shows that  many country-pairs  did not  have  a  single  merger  in  the whole 
sample period.  In 212 out  of 729 ordered country pairs  (29%), we do not observe any merger 
activity. Missing activity points towards a potential selection bias, where firms self-select into a 
sample of ‘merger-active countries’. This is consistent with the literature, which shows that cross-
border M&As are not random, but depend on many macroeconomic and institutional factors (Bris 
and Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al. 2008; Erel et al., 2012; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 
2006). For example, acquirers from Bulgaria only merge with targets in six foreign countries. All 
other country pairs with Bulgaria as acquirer self-select into a group without mergers. According to 
the literature, we cannot exclude that unobserved macroeconomic or institutional factors have to 
exceed a particular threshold before a country is observed as acquirer country. Particularly in times 
of crisis, countries that are in financial distress may be unobserved as acquirers, effectively biasing 
the sample towards non-crisis countries. To correct for this potential selection effect, we estimate a 
Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). In a first step, we estimate with maximum likelihood whether a 
particular country pair is actively merging or not using the following selection equation.
tTA,tTA, ε++α=Z tA,
Twβ (1)
We use an indicator variable for merger activity defined as ZTA,t =1 if Z*TA,t>0 and ZTA,t =0 
otherwise. Z*TA,t is a latent variable for an ordered country pair with target T and acquirer A in 
9quarter t. It reflects the propensity to be included in the merger sample. The vector wA,t contains k 
covariates with macroeconomic and institutional factors of the acquiring country which potentially 
affect the propensity to become an acquirer of foreign targets. The logic behind this is that, for firms 
to go abroad, the acquirer country needs to offer a sufficient set of supporting characteristics as 
captured in the selection equation (1). If this condition is met, both acquirer and target country 
characteristics determine the specific direction and magnitude of merger activity in the outcome 
equation specified below.6 The main results of this paper are also robust to the additional inclusion 
of  corresponding  target  country  covariates  (wT,t).  β is  a  coefficients  vector,  and εTA,t  a  random 
disturbance for the selection equation. 
In a second step, we estimate the following outcome equation, where YTA,t represents one of 
the two dependent variables, either the proportion of cross-border mergers in a country pair or the 
target premium.
tTA,tTA, u++γ=Y tTA,
Txδ (2)
Country-pair  specific  macroeconomic,  institutional,  financial,  and  deal-related  variables 
refer to the vector  xTA,t.  δ is a coefficients vector, and uTA,t a random disturbance for the outcome 
equation.
3.3 Methodological challenge #2: Merger waves
Figure 1 depicts the total number of M&A deals in the EU from 1999 to 2012 revealing a cyclical  
pattern. The period includes the peak of the fifth merger wave in 2000, the subsequent burst of the 
‘dotcom bubble’, and the complete sixth merger wave from 2004 to 2007. There is a pronounced 
decline in total and in cross-border M&A activity after the start of the financial crisis. 
=== INCLUDE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ===
Establishing definitive evidence of  fire  sales in  cyclical  markets  is  challenging,  because 
clustering of cross-border M&As coincides with similar patterns in domestic activity. The ratio of 
cross-border deals to total deals fluctuates around 25% before the crisis and then drops to around 
6 Baker et al.’s (2009) cheap financial capital hypothesis uses a similar argument.
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20% from 2008 to 2012. Moreover, even if a change in FDI in crisis countries seems significant 
relative to pre-crisis levels of the same country, it may be less considerable when viewed against the 
general backdrop of the European M&A cycle. Previous literature often de-trended M&A activity; 
however, most approaches are crude such as being above or below a five-year average (Bouwman 
et al., 2009). We estimate the cyclical component of M&A activity with a trigonometric regression 
allowing for higher order polynomials, to ensure that boundary conditions are fulfilled (Cox 2006; 
Eubank and Speckman, 1990; Popinski, 1999). Specifically, if merger activity  mt exhibits waves 
captured in the term μ(t), then
ttt ε+=m µ
where μt has the following general form.
(3)
( ) ( )( )∑∑ λµ
11
sincos
j=
jj
d
j=
j
j0t jts+jtc+tb+b=
(4)
The cyclical component  μt consists  of an intercept  b0,  a polynomial trend (the terms  bjtj 
where t refers to the time dimension), and cycles captured by the Fourier series cjcos(jt)+sjsin(jt). 
Using standard methods to specify model (4) based on information criteria (SBIC, Akaike), the 
optimal number of cycles is four with different periodicity (one to four years) and the non-linear 
time trend has order four. We then estimate the M&A activity between ordered country pairs with 
the trigonometric regression (4). Figure 2 plots the annual activity of all cross-border M&As labeled 
mt and the fitted values mt* of the trigonometric regression (4). 
=== INCLUDE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ===
Figure 2 confirms that the trigonometric specification of order four exhibits a good fit. The 
total  cyclical  component  Ct is  computed  as  the  sum  of  the  four  cyclical  components,  which 
represents a Fourier series. Finally, we correct M&A activity between country pairs by dividing the 
cross-border activity YTA,t with the total cyclical component Ct, normalized over the range of Ct.
YTA,tC =
YTA,t
Ct −min Ct( )
max Ct( ) −min Ct( ) +1
(5)
Hence,  the  higher  the  European  merge  cycle  Ct,  the  lower  weighs  a  surge  in  mergers 
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between a specific country pair YTA,t, because the increase in YTA,t is less likely to be driven by 
country-specific  determinants.  If  the  European  merger  cycle  is  at  its  minimum,  the  de-cycled 
merger activity between a country pair is YCTA,t = YTA,t. If mergers between a country pair increase, 
but  together  with  a  European  merger  wave,  then  YCTA,t <  YTA,t.  In  an  alternative  econometric 
specification, we use the unadjusted merger activity YTA,t as the dependent and use Ct as a control 
variable in both the selection and the outcome equation of the Heckman model. The results reported 
in this paper are valid for both specifications. For brevity, we report the results for the de-cycled 
dependent YCTA,t only.
4. Variables
4.1 Dependent variables
(a) Merger activity  (YTA,t): Our aim is  to  measure the propensity  of firms from one country to 
acquire firms from another country, particularly if the latter were affected by the financial crisis. 
Following  Erel  et  al.  (2012),  our  dependent  variable  measures  the  proportion  of  cross-border 
mergers between a country pair (XTA,t) in a specific quarter t as a percentage of both the number of 
domestic mergers in the target country (XT,t) and the number of cross-border mergers between the 
country pair (XTA,t). Hence, the dependent variable YTA,t (before de-cycling), which we referred to in 
the preceding section, is defined as YTA,t=XTA,t/(XTA,t+XT,t). A higher value of YTA,t means that the 
amount of cross-border takeovers in a target country from a certain acquiring country has increased 
relative to the number of domestic deals. Obviously, YTA,t is in the range 0 to 1. The inclusion of 
both domestic and cross-border deals in the denominator controls for factors that influence both 
types of M&A activity.7
(b) Target premium: The target premium is the final price (F) per ordinary share offered by 
the  acquirer  divided  by  the  target’s  stand-alone  share  price  (P)  one  week  before  the  first 
announcement of the merger. The variable is provided by the Thomson Reuters SDC database and 
7 This approach follows Erel et al. (2012), Ferreira et al. (2009) and Rossi and Volpin (2004).
12
refers  to  a  percentage  measure  (F/P-1)100.  For  each  country-pair,  we  take  the  average  target 
premium per quarter.8
4.2 Independent variables
(a) Crisis period: The dummy variable is equal to one for the period from 2008 to 2012 and zero 
otherwise. In the US, the first signs of the crisis were publicly recognizable in mid-2007. In June, 
Bear Stearns supported two failing hedge funds and then disclosed in July 2007 that they had lost 
almost all their value. Subsequently, three big credit rating agencies downgraded several mortgage 
products causing an increase in interest rate spreads in August 2007 (Mizen, 2008). Although the 
global implications of these events were not clear at first, the financial crisis fully reached Europe 
and  other  parts  of  the  world  with  the  filing  for  Chapter  11  bankruptcy  protection  of  Lehman 
Brothers on 15th September 2008. We take the middle point of these two dates (2008q1) as the first 
‘crisis quarter’ in Europe.9
(b) Crisis countries: Following Beetsma et al. (2013) as well as Kalbaska and Gatkowski 
(2012), the following target countries are regarded as crisis countries in the EU: Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain are grouped together in the dummy ‘Crisis countries (T,4)’. The dummy ‘Crisis  
countries (T,5)’ also includes Ireland. All five countries experienced severe problems during the 
crisis and were partly cut-off from capital markets (Beetsma et al., 2013). 
(c) Alternative crisis country proxies: A dummy variable cannot capture gradual differences 
in financial distress within and between countries. We therefore compute six continuous variables as 
alternative proxies: two variables for economic risk, two for (potential) economic demand, and two 
for macroeconomic liquidity.  For each of these variables,  we gathered data on a monthly basis 
which we converted to quarterly data by taking simple averages. We then compute the difference 
between the target and the acquirer country.10 Hence a high value indicates that the target country 
8 For robustness, we also computed target premiums with stand-alone share prices one day or four weeks prior to the 
merger announcement. The results remain qualitatively intact. We only report the results for the one-week measure.
9 The results of this paper do not depend on this specific date. The reported results remain intact if we use crisis 
dummies starting in 2007q3 or in 2008q3.
10 We indicate this by adding ‘(T-A)’ to the variable name.
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scores higher than the acquirer. To ensure weak endogeneity, all variables are lagged by one quarter 
unless stated otherwise.
Yield, souv. bond (T-A): The first proxy for macroeconomic risk is the harmonized 10-year 
government bond yield (source: Datastream/Eurostat).  A higher yield indicates higher sovereign 
default risk. In case of missing values, we turn to the long-term government bond yield (source:  
Datastream/International  Financial  Statistics).11Rating,  Moody's  (T-A): The  second  proxy  is  the 
long-term sovereign credit rating issued by Moody’s Investors Service. To be able to use credit 
ratings for a quantitative analysis, we follow Cantor and Packer (1997) and assign numerical values 
for each rating (e.g. AAA is coded as 1, Aa1 as 2). A higher value indicates a lower rating.12
Economic sentiment (T-A): The first proxy for economic demand is economic sentiment. The 
data is compiled by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and 
consist  of  five  components:  industrial  confidence  (40%),  services  confidence  (30%),  consumer 
confidence  (20%),  construction  (5%),  and  retail  trade  (5%).  A  high  value  indicates  more 
confidence.13 Household fin. sit. (T-A): The second proxy assesses the financial situation of private 
households, compiled by the DG ECFIN using a survey. A high value indicates a better financial 
situation. 
Domestic credit (T-A): The first proxy for macroeconomic liquidity of a target country is a 
measure of resources provided to the private sector, as percent of GDP (source: World Bank). These 
resources are not limited to credit or loans by the banking sector. The variable is only available on a 
yearly  basis  and is  lagged by one year.  Domestic  credit  banking (T-A): The  second proxy for 
macroeconomic liquidity is a measure of all  credit  provided by banks.  The amount of credit  is 
expressed as a percent of GDP (source: World Bank). The variable is only available on a yearly 
11 We also tried to compute the spread on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). Unfortunately, CDS data is only 
available since 2007 for most countries.
12 We also computed Moody’s Rating where the watch list is taken into account. The watch list states whether a rating is 
under review (Keenan et al., 1998). If a sovereign is placed on review for downgrade, a half-point is added to its 
numerical rating, while a half-point is deducted when a sovereign is placed on review for upgrade. However, the 
reported results for ‘Rating, Moody's (T-A)’ do not change when we consider the watch list.
13 As industrial confidence is the most important component in the economic sentiment index, we ran robustness checks 
with the industrial confidence index on its one. The reported results do not change qualitatively.
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basis and is lagged by one year.
4.3 Control variables
We use control variables for differences in (i) the economic and financial situation of a country pair, 
(ii)  institutional differences,  and (iii)  for deal-specific  characteristics,  averaged per  quarter.  The 
choice of control variables is based on similar specifications in the pertinent cross-border M&A 
literature (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; Kling et al., 2014; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). All variables with ‘(T-
A)’ are differences between target and acquirer countries used in the outcome equations. Variables 
with ‘(T)’ or ‘(A)’ only apply to the target or acquirer country, used in the selection equation. With 
the exception of deal-specific characteristics, all time-varying variables are lagged by one period.
 
4.3.1 Economic and financial control variables
We include the log GDP per capita in USD at constant prices (GDP/CAP (T-A); source: World 
Bank).  To  account  for  the  degree  of  stock  market  development,  we  measure  the  market 
capitalization as percent of GDP (MKTCAP (T-A); source: World Bank). Year-on-year growth rates 
of GDP in current USD (source: World Bank) are deflated using the US Consumer Price Index 
(source: Datastream) (GDP growth (T-A)). The total of imports and exports as a percent of GDP 
proxies  the  openness  of  the  economy  (source:  United  Nations  Commodity  Trade  Statistics 
Database)  (Openness  (T-A)).14 To  capture  stock  market  valuation,  we  determined  the  quarterly 
value-weighted ratio  between the  market  and book values  for  all  listed companies  per  country 
(Market-to-book (T-A)). We winsorized all values at the 1 and 99 percentile at country-year level to 
correct for outliers. The difference in the quarterly nominal return on the local stock market index 
between acquirer  and target  country indicates  relative  performance (Stock  market  return (T-A)) 
(source: Datastream). We resorted to a Datastream index if an official index was unavailable. We 
used either an MSCI or an S&P country index if a Datastream index did not exist. The standard 
14 Not all import and export figures for 2011 were published. If missing, we used the 2010 values for 2011 as well.
15
deviation of the local stock market accounts for risk (S.D. stock market return (T-A)). We calculated 
the quarterly standard deviation based on monthly returns of each country’s stock market in local 
currency (source: Datastream). To determine the real appreciation of a country’s currency, we first  
calculated  the  nominal  appreciation  versus  USD  for  each  currency  and  quarter  (Currency 
appreciation (T-A); source: Datastream/ WM/Reuters). We then deflated the nominal appreciation 
by the difference in CPI between the country and the US (source: Datastream/Eurostat). As a last 
step, we deducted the real appreciation of the target country’s currency against the US dollar from 
the acquirer country’s corresponding value.
4.3.2 Institutional control variables:
The governance indicator (Governance index (T-A)) from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
dataset measures six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and lack 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. We 
averaged the outcomes across the six variables for each country. We interpolated linearly between 
years in case of missing values. We collected the total tax rate as reported by the World Bank (Tax 
rate (T-A)).15 We used Stulz and Williamson (2003) data on language for most countries (Same 
language (T-A)). If data were missing, we resorted to the Language Database (http://www.language-
database.com).16 Given  that  most  countries  in  Europe  have  different  languages,  we  coded  the 
language group for each language. We create a dummy LANGUAGE which takes value one if both 
countries share the same language group and zero otherwise. A commonly used cultural variable is 
religious proximity (see, e.g., Erel at al. 2012). We therefore compute a dummy equal to one if the  
primary religion of the acquirer and target country is identical (Same religion (T-A)).  Given the 
limited heterogeneity in Europe, for 16 countries are primarily Catholic and seven are Protestant, 
we also used the difference in religiosity between countries. Religiosity is defined as the percentage 
15 Data is available as of 2005. Given the fairly constant nature of tax rates, we apply the 2005 numbers also to the 
years 1999 – 2004.
16 Luxembourgish is absent on this website. We used Wikipedia to find that this language belongs to the Germanic 
language group.
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of inhabitants in a certain country who believe that there is a God (Population ratio believers (T-
A)). The data refers to the Special Eurobarometer issued by the European Commission (2005).17 
Finally,  the composition of the EU has changed several times since 1999. To account for these 
changes, we computed the dummy EU_NEW. This variable takes the value one for countries which 
have entered the EU after 1999.
4.3.3 Deal-specific control variables:
All deal-specific control variables refer to SDC. We controlled for the number of mergers where 
cash was the only means of payment (Ratio all-cash deals). The variable ‘Ratio horizontal deals’  
refers to the number of mergers where the target and the acquirer are in the same industry (four-
digit SIC). We account for the following deal-specific factors: (a) the number of mergers that are 
withdrawn before completion (Ratio withdrawn deals); (b) the number of mergers with a public 
acquirer (Ratio public acquirer); (c) the number of friendly mergers (Ratio friendly deals); (d) the 
number  of  mergers  where  the  target  is  privatized  (Ratio  privatization);  and (e)  the  number  of 
mergers where acquirer makes a tender offer (Ratio tender offers). All measures are expressed as a 
fraction of all mergers per country pair and quarter.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics and Pearson coefficients of pairwise correlations between all 
variables  in  the  outcome  equation.  The  first  two  variables  of  the  table  depict  the  dependent 
variables. The summary statistics for variables (3) to (15) refer to differences between target and 
acquirer nations. Bid characteristics are depicted in variables (16) to (22). 8.3% of all deals were 
financed entirely in cash, 41% of the deals were horizontal, and only 1.3% of all announced deals 
were withdrawn before completion. 43.1% of the mergers involved a publicly listed acquirer. The 
17  A popular alternative measure for cultural proximity is the geodesic distance between capital cities. In unreported 
robustness checks we included this measure in addition to the variables that pertain to language, religion and 
governance. All results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. The results of the robustness checks 
can be requested from the authors.
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large majority of deals (92.9%) were friendly. Finally, variables (23) to (28) represent crisis proxies. 
Sovereign bond yields for target countries are higher than for acquirer countries. Target countries 
usually exhibit a lower credit rating indicated by a positive mean (credit  rating is coded on an 
inverse scale).  Economic sentiment,  household financial  situation,  credit  supplied to the private 
sector, and credit supplied by the financial sector are all lower, on average, in the target country vis-
à-vis the acquiring country.
In Table 2, all pairwise correlations above 0.0276 are statistically significant at the 1% level,  
except correlations with ‘target premium’, where all values above 0.0838 are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Multicollinearity should not be an issue indicated by a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test of the baseline specification (Model A3, see next section). The mean VIF is 1.54 and the 
variable with the highest VIF,  ‘Governance index (T-A)’ has a value of 4.53, which is still well 
below 5.3, the cut-off point according to Hair et al. (1992) or even 10, the cut-off according to 
Belsley et al. (1980) and Studenmund (1992). 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ===
Table 2 reveals a high correlation between some of the crisis proxies, e.g., between ‘Yield,  
souv. bond (T-A)’ and ‘Rating, Moody’s (T-A)’. This is not surprising, as these proxies are meant to 
be alternative measurements of the same characteristic, i.e. sovereign default risk. We therefore 
analyze these proxies individually in separate model specifications. Multicollinearity may still arise 
as a methodological challenge, because ‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’ and to a lesser extent ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’ 
are also highly correlated with almost all continuous crisis proxies. As these are our variables of 
interest, we cannot simply exclude them from model specifications. Thus, we create a set of dummy 
variables for ‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’ and ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’ whose threshold levels refer to quintiles as cut 
off points. The reference dummy is highly correlated with all other independent variables. Hence, 
the reference dummy absorbs much of the multicollinearity so that remaining dummies are less 
related  to  other  independent  variables.  As  the  reference  category  dummy  is  excluded  from 
regressions, multicollinearity is not a concern.
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5. Results
5.1 Merger activity
We use  a  multivariate  regression  framework with  a  Heckman approach to  correct  for  possible 
selection  biases.  All  standard  errors  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustering  within 
country pairs. All estimations include period fixed effects for year-quarters, although we do not 
report them in tables. We start with two dichotomous variables: a dummy for the crisis period and a 
dummy for crisis countries. Table 3 shows the results of the outcome equation. Model A1 introduces 
all macroeconomic control variables, while all deal-specific control variables are added in Model 
A2.  The  negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  for  ‘Crisis  period’ shows  that  the 
proportion of cross-border mergers dropped after the start of the crisis in 2008. The dummy for the 
four crisis countries Portugal,  Italy,  Greece, and Spain shows a generally higher level of cross-
border activity. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ===
This positive relation between  ‘Crisis countries (T,4)’ and cross-border mergers applies to 
the whole period and not only to the crisis. Moreover, the statistical significance weakens as more 
controls are added in Model A2. Using individual country dummies in Model A3 and A4 shows that  
the positive correlation is not robust. It only weakly holds for Portugal and Greece (p<0.1), but not 
for Italy, Spain (Model A3), or Ireland (Model A4). Model  A5  and  A6  investigate  the  interaction 
between  the  crisis  period  and  the  crisis  country  dummies.  The  fire-sale  hypothesis  predicts  a 
positive interaction coefficient, more sales by crisis countries in times of crisis, which we do not 
find for the group of four or five crisis countries. The base effect of the interaction for the crisis  
countries is only significant in Model A6 but not in A5. Although this result does not provide strong 
support for the fire-sales hypothesis, there is also no clear evidence against it, which would be a 
pronounced drop of foreign investments in crisis countries in times of crisis.
The  coefficients  of  the  control  variables  in  Models  A1  to  A6  are  consistent  across  all 
19
specifications  and in  line with prior  research.  Target  countries  are  less  or  equally wealthy and 
financially developed than acquirer countries, which can be seen from the dummies for the quintiles 
for GDP per capita and financial market capitalization (the 5th quintile is the lowest). Investments 
in target countries also increase with higher GDP growth, more openness of the economy, lower 
market-to-book ratios, lower stock market returns, lower currency appreciation, same language and 
religion, and lower tax rates. All findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The negative relationship with the ratio of targets that are privatized can be 
explained by the fact that  a high privatization ratio might  proxy more regulated and less open 
economies. A robustness check without this control variable does not produce qualitatively different 
results.
Table 3s in the appendix summarizes the corresponding selection equation. The hypothesis 
that rho=0 is rejected. As rho measures the correlation between the error terms of the selection and 
outcome equation, a positive rho means that the selection into the outcome equation is not random 
validating a Heckman procedure. The selection equations in Table 3s show that acquirers have a 
higher propensity to invest in cross-border deals when they come from high tax countries, with high 
market-to-book ratios, high currency appreciation and less volatile financial  markets (low  ‘S.D.  
stock market return (A)’).18 This is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004) and with the notion of multinationals as cross-border arbitrageurs of relatively 
cheap capital (Baker et al., 2009).
A dummy variable for a group of crisis countries is a blunt proxy as it is not able to capture 
gradual differences in economic conditions. Table 4 therefore reports six continuous variables as 
alternative proxies.
=== INCLUDE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ===
Model C1 and C2 include sovereign bond yields (‘Yield, souv. bond (T-A)’) and Moody’s 
18 Acquirers are also less likely to originate from countries with high openness. One reason might be that ‘Openness (T-
A)’ is negatively correlated with ‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’, ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’, and positively correlated with ‘GDP growth (T-
A)’ (see Table 2). Hence, openness may partially proxy less wealthy and developed economies with more growth 
potential, which are typically target countries and not acquirers.
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sovereign credit rating (‘Rating, Moody's (T-A)’). The variable  ‘Crisis period interaction’ reports 
the coefficients of the interaction effect of the respective proxy with the dummy ‘Crisis period’. In 
line with the fire-sale hypothesis, we find a significant positive interaction effect for both country 
risk  variables  with  the  crisis  period  (‘Crisis  period  interaction’).  The  positive  base  effect  of 
‘Rating, Moody's (T-A)’ in Model C2 indicates that countries with higher risk also attracted more 
foreign buyers before 2008. This indicates a generally attractive risk return trade-off, which is even 
stronger in times of crisis. Sovereign bond yields in Model C1 exhibit a negative base effect, but 
only in combination with the interaction effect. If the interaction variable ‘Crisis period interaction’ 
is dropped from Model C1 (unreported), the overall effect of  ‘Yield, souv. bond (T-A)’ is positive 
and significant (p<0.05).
Model  C3  and  C4  introduce  two  variables  for  (potential)  economic  demand:  economic 
sentiment and the financial situation of private households. According to the fire-sale hypothesis, 
we expect a negative interaction effect of the economic demand proxies with the ‘Crisis dummy’, 
which we confirm empirically in Models C3 and C4 (‘Crisis period interaction’) . Yet, the base 
effects for ‘Economic sentiment (T-A)’ and ‘Household fin. sit. (T-A)’ are positive and significant. 
Also, when we drop the variable ‘Crisis period interaction’ from Models C3 and C4 (unreported), 
the overall effect of both economic demand proxies is positive (p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively). In 
general, cross-border acquirers seek targets in countries with high economic demand, but in times of 
crisis, target countries with particularly low economic sentiment and household finance become 
attractive, confirming the fire-sale hypothesis.19
Model  C4  and  C5  include  two  variables  for  macroeconomic  liquidity:  domestic  credit 
provided to the private sector (‘Domestic credit (T-A)’) and domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector (‘Dom. credit banking (T-A)’). The fire-sale hypothesis contends that a shortage of domestic 
liquidity forces local owners to sell their firms to foreign buyers with superior access to liquidity 
(Krugman, 2000).  We therefore expect  a  negative coefficient  of the interaction variable  ‘Crisis  
19 We also find similar results for industrial confidence, which is one component of ‘Economic sentiment (T-A)’.
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period interaction’ in both Models C4 and C5. The results, however, show exactly the opposite 
effect. Countries with lower (higher) domestic credit attract a lower (higher) proportion of cross-
border mergers during the crisis years. The base effect for ‘Domestic credit banking (T-A)’ in Model 
C6 is weakly negative, but this effect becomes statistically insignificant when the variable 'Crisis  
period interaction' is dropped from the model (unreported).
Hence, on the one hand, we do find evidence consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis for 
countries with higher default risk and lower economic demand in the crisis. On the other hand, for 
countries with lower domestic credit, which provide the most important ‘test bed’ for the fire-sale 
hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the notion of a sell-out of corporate assets in times of a  
shortage of liquidity. A brief look at all other variables in Table 4 does not reveal any surprises. The 
base effect of the crisis period dummy is consistently negative across all models, as expected, and 
all control variables exhibit a qualitatively similar behavior as in Table 3.
Finally, we inspect the results of the selection equation in Table 4s in the appendix. Again, 
most effects are similar to Table 3s and the test for independent equations (H0: rho=0) is rejected 
confirming the need for a Heckman approach. Domestic credit proxies in the selection equation 
exhibit positive and significant coefficients underlining that acquirers are more likely to originate 
from countries with higher domestic credit (Models C5 and C6 of Table 4s), which is consistent  
with  fire-sales.  This  finding,  however,  can  be  also  explained  by  the  ‘cheap  financial  capital 
hypothesis’ of Baker et al. (2009), which suggests that multinationals use FDI as a financial capital 
channel from acquirer countries with relatively low-cost capital.
5.2 Target premium
Unfortunately, the data for target premiums is mostly limited to public targets reducing the sample 
to 910 observations in the outcome equation with 34,330 observations in the selection equation. The 
test for the independence of the selection and the outcome equations cannot reject the null with p-
values  in  the  ranges  from  p=0.187  to  p=0.862,  depending  on  model  specification,  making  a 
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Heckman  procedure  obsolete.  Accordingly,  we  report  outcome  equations  using  General  Least 
Squares (GLS) panel regressions. We use random-effects estimators per ordered country pair and 
include period fixed effects for year-quarters, although we do not report them in tables. All standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
We start with the analysis of two dummy variables for the crisis period and for a group of 
crisis  countries.  Table  5  reports  the  results  of  the  GLS  estimation.  Model  B1  introduces  all 
macroeconomic control variables and Model B2 all deal-specific control variables. We find a strong 
negative  relationship  between  ‘Crisis  countries  (T,4)’ and  target  premiums.  This  applies  to  the 
whole period and, as the country break-up in Model B3 and B4 shows, also to each crisis country 
individually. The only exception is Ireland (Model B4), where targets seem to be equally expensive 
as in the rest of the EU. Although crisis countries generally have lower selling prices, the positive 
coefficient of the dummy  ‘Crisis period’ indicates a tendency towards higher premiums in crisis 
years. This effect is only weakly significant and not robust (see Model B5 and B6 in Table 5 and all  
models  in  Table  6),  but  we can  confidently  conclude  that  the  average  premium paid  does  not 
decrease during the crisis.
=== INCLUDE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ===
The most important test for the fire-sale hypothesis is the interaction of the crisis countries 
with the crisis period.  The fire-sale hypothesis  predicts  that target prices drop in a crisis,  often 
below their  fundamental value (Krugman, 2000). As the results in Table 5 show, the respective 
interaction effects in Model B5 and B6 are not negative (Model B5 even reports a statistically weak 
positive effect). Although prices for crisis countries are generally low, they seem to remain on that 
level and do not drop to fire-sale levels during the crisis.
Table 6 shows six alternative proxies for the crisis country dummies in Table 5: sovereign 
risk measures (Model D1 and D2), proxies for economic demand (Model D3 and D4), as well as 
measures of domestic credit (Model D5 and D6). For each of these models, the fire-sale hypothesis 
would predict significant interaction effects. However, we do not find any significant interaction 
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effects (see variable ‘Crisis period interaction’) in any of the models.
=== INCLUDE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ===
In  Model  D5  and D6,  the  base  effect  of  the  two  domestic  credit  variables  is  positive, 
suggesting  lower  target  prices  when  the  target  country  has  liquidity  issues.  Although  this 
interpretation is in line with fire-sale FDI, the base effect of domestic credit applies to the whole 
period and not only to the crisis. In fact, the positive relationship between each of the two domestic  
credit variables and target premiums prevails when we exclude the interaction variables from Model 
D5 and D6 (p<0.1 and p<0.05; unreported). The general nature of this effect is not consistent with 
fire-sale prices in liquidity-constrained target countries during times of crisis.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates how the financial crisis affected the selling and buying of corporate assets 
between EU countries. In particular, we test the fire-sale FDI hypothesis using a large panel of  
corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012. In general, we detect a decline in 
cross-border activity during the crisis, which applies to all EU countries. When we use sovereign 
risk measures, macroeconomic demand conditions and credit  conditions to identify countries in 
distress, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, for countries with higher default risk and lower 
economic demand in the crisis, the results are consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis. On the other 
hand, for countries with lower domestic credit, which provide the most important ‘test bed’ for the 
fire-sale hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the notion of fire-sales. CDS spreads may clarify 
the mixed results, as they are an alternative measure (to sovereign bond spreads) for a country’s 
default risk in the European financial crisis (Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012). Unfortunately, the 
data quality and coverage for CDS spreads is not sufficient for our purposes, particularly in the 
early years of our sample and for the crisis countries.20 We therefore did not include CDS spreads, 
as they would have led to a severe bias of our sample. Undoubtedly, this is a limitation of our study. 
20  In Thomson Reuter’s Datastream, for example, reliable coverage of sovereign CDS spreads starts between 2003 
(e.g. Sweden, Denmark) and 2008 (Finland).
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Our results show that premiums are generally lower in crisis countries, but they do not drop 
further amid the crisis. Although we find evidence for depressed prices if credit liquidity in the 
target country is low, this effect is not stronger in the crisis, which is not consistent with fire-sale 
FDI. It rather indicates that fire-sales are ‘business as usual’ (Alquist et al., 2013). This paper finds 
little evidence for the view that European crisis countries fire-sale their assets, which is in line with 
recent studies of Alquist et al. (2013) and Chari et al. (2010) for emerging markets.
Our analysis  contributes  to  several  antecedents  that  the  literature  has  shown to  play  an 
important  role  in  cross-border  M&As.  A first  antecedent  is  the  relative  difference  in  market 
development and growth prospects. Di Giovanni (2005) reveals that the ratio of financial market 
capitalization  to  GDP in  the  acquirer  country  is  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of  firms 
investing abroad. Target countries with lower GDP per capita coupled with higher GDP growth 
rates (both in relative terms) also attract more cross-border M&As (e.g., Norden and Posch, 2012). 
This paper confirms these findings. Differences in corporate governance and institutions are another 
driver for cross-border M&As. Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that cross border M&As often involve 
a target operating in an environment with less shareholder protection, implying that the transferal of 
the same level of investor protection to the target enhances value. In line with this, Chari et al.  
(2010) contend that companies from developed countries enjoy stock price gains after acquiring 
targets that are exposed to a weaker institutional environment. Other evidence shows that acquirers 
from countries with stricter governance pay higher premiums for cross-border targets (Bris and 
Cabolis,  2008)  and  that  targets  in  countries  with  weaker  institutions  are  sold  for  lower  prices 
(Weitzel and Berns, 2006).21 However, our results do not show a significant association of quality of 
governance with cross-border M&As. This is not surprising as one reason for our focus on EU 
countries was to reduce confounding effects. A third antecedent are differences in capital supply and 
valuation  between  the  acquirer  and  target  country.  FDI  into  crisis  countries  may  be  due  to 
undervalued assets in the target country and cheap financial capital in the acquirer country, which 
21 Further, supporting evidence shows that Tobin’s Q of the industry in which a target is active increases after a cross-
border merger (Bris et al., 2008). 
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Baker et al. (2009) refer to as cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals. Although we find 
little evidence for the former, our results provide some hints in support of the latter. We find that 
acquirers come from countries with easier access to capital in the form of high market-to-book 
ratios and higher currency appreciation, and that they invest in target countries with less domestic 
credit.  This  is  in  line  with  previous  studies  that  show  that  acquirers  typically  originate  from 
countries with relatively low-cost capital (Baker et al., 2009; Erel et al., 2012). However, our paper 
does not provide a direct test of cross-border capital arbitrage within the EU, nor does it allow clear  
implications in this respect. In fact, many of our results show that the crisis had only a limited effect 
on M&As into crisis countries and on respective target prices. Hence, capital market imperfections 
in  target  or  acquirer  countries,  favoring  the  fire-sale  of  cheap  financial  capital  hypothesis, 
respectively,  both  seem  to  be  attenuated  by  European  capital  market  integration.  We  readily 
acknowledge that these are only indications, but our results indicate an interesting avenue for future 
research.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Number of mergers per country pair from 1999 to 2012
The column ‘Total’ reports the totals only for cross-border mergers. The column ‘Total (%)’ expresses the cross-border mergers for a respective country 
as a percentage of the total cross-border merger activity.
Target: Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus
Czech 
Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania
Luxem
bourg Malta
Nether
lands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden
United 
Kingdom Total Total (%)
Acquirer:
Austria 806 18 26 0 48 11 2 10 31 354 3 54 4 38 2 0 3 0 27 35 2 34 24 23 13 25 42 829 4.4%
Belgium 12 914 6 0 19 13 3 12 265 128 6 9 6 42 1 1 26 0 171 15 11 10 6 5 49 20 109 945 5.0%
Bulgaria 0 0 221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.0%
Cyprus 0 0 7 120 5 2 2 1 0 6 17 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 5 1 13 0 0 2 2 11 79 0.4%
Czech 
Republic 3 0 5 0 558 0 1 0 2 17 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 10 0 3 27 2 1 2 7 90 0.5%
Denmark 15 16 5 2 12 1447 3 55 46 118 1 6 7 30 6 25 1 0 51 40 4 7 4 1 37 232 99 823 4.3%
Estonia 0 0 1 0 1 1 170 15 1 0 3 1 0 0 23 22 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71 0.4%
Finland 15 17 1 0 18 52 74 2078 35 140 1 12 5 32 22 31 0 1 53 44 1 5 10 3 17 284 60 933 4.9%
France 31 249 13 2 61 49 4 26 7593 418 20 31 31 218 4 4 24 2 185 99 52 32 11 5 309 87 472 2439 12.8%
Germany 336 132 23 3 123 110 6 61 380 8562 16 66 23 214 8 11 27 1 302 126 15 33 26 12 155 158 448 2815 14.8%
Greece 6 6 33 37 3 3 0 2 8 19 997 10 3 13 0 0 1 0 9 8 1 30 2 0 15 6 20 235 1.2%
Hungary 4 0 7 0 14 0 0 1 3 5 0 374 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 15 2 14 6 1 0 0 2 79 0.4%
Ireland 8 22 5 0 4 11 1 8 26 34 0 6 555 9 2 0 0 0 37 7 3 1 3 0 6 19 374 586 3.1%
Italy 25 25 12 0 22 5 2 14 189 176 17 13 6 3053 4 3 7 1 43 33 16 21 7 4 140 32 137 954 5.0%
Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 13 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 100 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 38 0.2%
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 14 158 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 5 1 45 0.2%
Luxembourg 8 14 5 0 7 9 1 3 43 70 4 4 1 22 0 1 28 0 23 23 3 5 4 0 12 12 30 304 1.6%
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 12 0.1%
Netherlands 34 243 13 4 53 58 5 40 199 403 16 34 27 102 9 7 15 2 2695 58 27 32 13 4 138 84 304 1924 10.1%
Poland 5 1 5 3 32 6 2 2 4 30 0 11 3 5 1 24 1 0 5 1534 0 13 8 0 11 4 4 180 0.9%
Portugal 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 12 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 663 1 0 0 102 0 11 156 0.8%
Romania 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 225 3 0 3 0 4 28 0.1%
Slovakia 3 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 1 2 0 0 33 0.2%
Slovenia 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 171 2 1 2 31 0.2%
Spain 7 13 2 0 18 8 0 18 151 78 4 3 6 80 0 3 5 0 33 28 135 2 2 0 4255 9 67 672 3.5%
Sweden 22 44 7 2 36 304 49 334 135 194 7 14 15 51 27 29 8 4 104 63 9 9 8 9 56 3825 245 1785 9.4%
United 
Kingdom 45 115 16 9 55 104 8 65 453 570 21 34 293 202 6 6 10 4 287 83 47 35 15 3 234 211 16284 2931 15.4%
Total 585 918 195 64 555 749 188 671 1990 2784 140 327 433 1080 131 182 128 15 1339 707 330 302 184 73 1304 1197 2453
Total (%) 3.1% 4.8% 1.0% 0.3% 2.9% 3.9% 1.0% 3.5% 10.5% 14.6% 0.7% 1.7% 2.3% 5.7% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 0.1% 7.0% 3.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.0% 0.4% 6.9% 6.3% 12.9%
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Figure 1. Cross-border and domestic M&As in the EU from 1999 to 2012
Number of M&A transactions in the EU per quarter split into the number of cross-border deals 
within the EU, number of total deals in the EU, and the percentage of cross-border deals. We 
included all countries that are part of the EU as of 2012 for each year.
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Figure 2. Actual number of cross-border M&As and fitted values
Fitted values refer to the trigonometric regression as shown in equation (4) using an optimal number 
of cycles and non-linear time trend.
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APPENDIX
Table 3s: Selection equation results for Table 3
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Table 4s: Selection equation results for Table 4
